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1. Abstract 
Wage inequality in the U.S. and its 
trading partner Mexico has increased 
since the late 1970s. However, wage 
inequality in some newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs) such as Taiwan and 
South Korea decreases since the late 
1980s. We provide a new explanation that 
a rise in capital flow from the NIE to the 
less-developed country (LDC), and a 
corresponding rise in the intermediate 
good exporting from the vertical 
multinationals to the subsidiaries in the 
LDC, have important consequences to 
account for the decrease in wage 
inequality of the NIE. We also show that 
relative wage between skilled and 
unskilled labor increases in the LDC. 
 
Key Words: Wage Inequality, Capital 
Flows, Vertical Multinationals, 
Intermediate Good, the newly 
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less-developed country. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1970s, the wages of 
less-skilled U.S. workers have fallen 
dramatically. The wage inequality 
between skilled and less-skilled workers 
is increased, as the wages of skilled 
workers increase relative to those of 
less-skilled workers. There are two 
explanations on the wage inequality of the 
U.S. One argues that international trade 
has contributed to the declining wage of 
the less-skilled workers. The other claims 
that technological innovation is a more 
plausible reason. In addition, empirical 
studies such as Feliciano (1993), and 
Beyer, Rojas, and Vergara (1999) show 
that wage inequality in some trading 
partners of the U.S. such as Mexico and 
Chile increases too. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1997) extend the analysis to the 
low-wage trading partners of the U.S. 
They give the third explanation that a 
flow of capital from North to South, and a 
corresponding rise in outsourcing by 
Northern multinationals, have contributed 
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to a worldwide increase in the relative 
demand for skilled workers. However, 
little attention has devoted to wage 
inequality of the newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs), such as Taiwan and 
South Korea, which demonstrates totally 
different pattern from that of the U.S. and 
Mexico. Chen and Hsu (1999) finds an 
interesting pattern which shows that wage 
inequality in Taiwan exhibits a declining 
trend since the mid-1980s. Chen and Hsu 
figure out that the relative wage between 
college graduates or above and mandatory 
education degree or below decreased by 
23.5 percent between 1987 and 1995. 
Kim and Topel (1995) show that the 
relative wage in South Korea also has the 
same trend. 
Taiwan has experienced a huge 
currency appreciation and a rapid increase 
in production costs since the late 1980s, 
which cause many domestic firms to 
invest abroad. Chung (1997) points out 
that Taiwan’s accumulated outward 
capital investment to China accounts for 
24.3 bill ion from 1986 to 1994, while that 
to three Southeast-Asian countries is 
14.04 billion. Since Taiwan is an NIE, its 
overseas investment is mainly motivated 
by low-wage considerations and thus 
concentrates in labor intensive industries. 
The multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
produce the intermediates, equipment, 
and materials at home, and ship them to 
the subsidiaries in the less-developed 
countries (LDCs). This kind of capital 
outflow is called vertical MNEs. Kao et al.  
(1995) show that 73.4 percent of the 
equipment and 52.3 percent of the 
material used by Taiwanese subsidiaries 
in China come from the vertical MNEs, 
while 25.8 percent of the subsidiaries uses 
intermediate goods provided by the 
vertical MNEs. In addition, Lin (1995) 
points out that most Taiwanese 
subsidiaries in Southeast-Asian countries 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
also use intermediate goods provided by 
the vertical MNEs. It so happens because 
the size of most Taiwanese companies is 
small or medium and many companies 
undertake subcontracting production. 
They have to maintain close connection 
between the vertical MNEs and the 
subsidiaries to reduce production costs. 
We thus provide the fourth explanation 
that a flow of capital from the NIEs to the 
LDCs, and a corresponding rise in 
exporting intermediate goods, materials, 
and equipment by the vertical MNEs, 
have caused the decrease in relative wage 
of the NIEs. 
 
2. The model 
Suppose that the economy consists 
of three parts: the NIE, the LDC, and the 
rest of the world. The variables of the 
LDC are indicated with an asterisk (*). 
The NIE produces two goods: the 
skilled-labor intensive good (X), and the 
intermediate good (M) that is 
unskilled-labor intensive. The production 
functions are assumed to be l inearly 
homogeneous. They are expressed as: 
),,(
Xs
KLXX =     (1) 
),,(
Mu
KLMM =     (2) 
where Li (i = s, u) denotes the skilled and 
unskilled labor employment, Kj (j = X,  M) 
represents the capital employment in 
sector j. 
Since all the markets are assumed 
to be perfectly competitive and there are 
constant returns to scale, the zero-profit 
condition in each sector implies that unit 
cost is equal to the price of the product. 
By choosing good X to be the numeraire, 
the price of good X can be normalized to 
unity. The zero-profit conditions can thus 
be described as: 
,1),( ≡=
Xs
X
PrwC    (3) 
,),(
Mu
M
PrwC =     (4) 
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where Ci (i = X, M) denotes the unit cost 
function for good i, ws (wu) represents 
wage rate of skilled (unskilled) labor, r is 
the rental rate of capital, Pi ( i = X,  M) is 
the price of good i. 
According to equations (1) and (2), 
we see that skilled labor and capital are 
used as factors of production for good X,  
while unskilled labor and capital are for 
good M. Suppose that there is a flow of 
capital, namely Ko, from the NIE to the 
LDC. By the use of Shephard’s lemma, 
the full employment conditions for skilled 
labor, unskilled labor, and capital can be 
derivable as: 
,),(
1 ss
X
LXrwC =     (5) 
,),(
1 uu
M
LMrwC =     (6) 
,),(),(
22 ou
M
s
X
KKMrwCXrwC −=+  
      (7) 
where Ci
j (i = 1, 2, j = X, M) denotes the 
partial derivative with respect to the ith 
variable in the function for sector j,  for 
example C1
X = ∂ CX/∂ ws, Li (i = s, u) 
represents the endowment of skilled and 
unskilled labor, K is the endowment of 
capital. 
Now we turn to develop the 
subsystem for the LDC. We assume that 
the LDC produces three goods: the 
skilled-labor intensive good (X
*), the 
unskilled-labor intensive good (Y
*), and 
the subsidiary-produced good (Z
*).  
Suppose that the subsidiary-produced 
good employs unskilled labor, 
intermediate good, and capital. For 
simplicity, we assume that the 
intermediate good and capital used to 
produce good Z
*  are provided solely by 
vertical MNEs. The skilled-labor 
intensive good uses skil led labor and 
domestic capital as factors of production, 
while those used in the unskilled-labor 
intensive good are unskilled labor and 
domestic capital. The production 
functions are all assumed to be linearly 
homogeneous, and can be expressed as: 
),,( ****
Xs
KLXX =     (8) 
),,( ****
Y
Y
u
KLYY =     (9) 
),,,( ***
o
Z
u
KMLZZ =    (10) 
where Lu
i* (i = Y*, Z*) denotes unskilled 
labor employed in sector i. We have 
argued that the pattern of the NIE’s 
overseas investment takes the form of 
vertical MNE. Hence, the flow of capital 
from the NIE to the LDC would lead to a 
corresponding rise in the demand for the 
intermediate good provided by vertical 
MNE. To exhibit this characteristic, we 
assume that the production function of the 
subsidiary-produced good takes the form 
of fixed proportion. We thus see that one 
unit of the intermediate good along with 
one unit of unskilled labor as well as one 
unit of capital can be used to produce one 
unit of good Z
*. We can then derive the 
following relationship: 
.** ZKLM
o
Z
u
===    (11) 
By assuming that all  markets are 
perfectly competitive, the long-run 
equilibrium conditions for commodity 
markets are: 
,1),( **** ≡=
Xs
X
PrwC    (12) 
,),( ****
Yu
Y
PrwC =     (13) 
,),,( ***
ZMu
Z
PrPwC =    (14) 
where Ci* (i = X*, Y*, Z*) denotes the unit 
cost function for good i,  Pi
* ( i = X*, Y*, Z*) 
represents the price of good i. We assume 
that relative to the rest of the world, the 
two countries are small. Under the 
assumption of small open economy, The 
price of good Y
* is exogenously given. 
However, since the intermediate good is 
provided solely from the vertical MNEs, 
its price is endogenously determined. 
By the use of Shephard’s lemma, 
the full employment conditions for skilled 
labor, unskil led labor, and capital in the 
LDC are derivable as: 
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,),( *****
1 ss
X
LXrwC =    (15) 
,),,(),( ****
1
****
1 uMu
Z
u
Y
LZrPwCYrwC =+
      (16) 
.),(),( *****
2
****
2
KYrwCXrwC
u
Y
s
X
=+  
      (17) 
Note that the foregoing system 
consists of thirteen equations. They are 
(3)-(7), and (11)-(17). It contains thirteen 
endogenous variables: w s, wu, r, PM, X, M,  
ws
*, wu
*, r*, PZ
*, X*, Y*, and Z*, and a 
policy variable Ko. 
 
3. Concluding remarks and discussion 
By manipulating the 
aforementioned model, we see that a rise 
in the flow of capital increases the output 
of the intermediate good. This will create 
an excess demand for unskilled labor, 
since the intermediate good is 
unskilled-labor intensive. The wage rate 
of unskilled labor will thus rise. On the 
other hand, since the output of good X 
falls and good X is skilled-labor intensive, 
this will create an excess supply of skilled 
labor and then lowers the wage rate of 
skilled labor. Hence, the wage inequality 
of the NIE decreases. We can thus 
establish: 
 
Proposition 1.  Suppose that the NIE’s 
vertical MNEs export the intermediate 
good to the subsidiaries in the LDC, and 
that the production function of the 
subsidiary-produced good is fixed 
proportion. A rise in the f low of capital 
decreases wage inequality of the NIE. 
 
By calculating the model, we see 
that owing to the fixed proportion 
production function of good Z
*, a rise of 
capital flow increases the employment of 
unskilled labor in producing Z
*. The 
demand for unskil led labor is thus 
increased, and then raises the wage rate of 
unskilled labor. Consequently, the wage 
rate of both the skilled and unskil led labor 
rises. However, from the long-run 
equilibrium condition of goods X
* and Y*,  
we see that the relative wage between 
skilled and unskil led labor increases if 
good X
* is capital intensive. It so happens 
because rental rate of capital falls, and 
tends to increase profits of good X
* more 
if good X* is capital intensive. Hence, the 
wage rate of skilled labor has to increase 
more to restore the zero-profit condition. 
We can thus derive the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2.  Suppose that the NIE’s 
vertical MNEs export the intermediate 
good to the subsidiaries in the LDC, and 
that the production function of the 
subsidiary-produced good is fixed 
proportion. A rise in the f low of capital 
increases wage inequality of the LDC if  
good X
* is capital intensive. 
 
We can then derive the following 
conclusion. A rise in the flow of capital 
from the NIE to the LDC, and a 
corresponding rise in exporting 
intermediate good by the NIE’s vertical 
MNEs, have important consequences for 
the wage inequality of the two countries. 
They decreases relative wage between 
skilled and unskil led labor of the NIE, 
while increases that of the LDC. This 
result stands in sharp contrast to the 
previous works, and provides a new 
explanation to account for the wage 
inequality of the NIE and LDC. 
 
4. Self-evaluation 
This paper satisfies most of the 
contents in the proposal. We drop the 
imperfect competition as a factor of wage 
inequality of the NIE, while introduce a 
flow of capital from the NIE to the LDC 
and a corresponding rise in the 
intermediate good exported by the vertical 
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MNEs as the crucial factors. Introducing 
these two factors, we succeed in 
explaining why wage inequality in the 
NIE has increased since the mid-1980s. In 
addition, we show that wage inequality in 
the LDC will increase. 
This paper fulfills the whole 
requirements outlined in the proposal. We 
provide a new explanation on the wage 
inequality of the NIE, which is not found 
in the previous studies. There must be a 
good chance to publish this paper in 
academic journals. 
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